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Introduction to the Notes of the ECAI-10 Workshop ARCOE-10
Automated Reasoning about Context and Ontology Evolution
Alan Bundya, Jos Lehmanna, Guilin Qib, Ivan Jose´ Varzinczakc
a School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh
b School of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University
c Meraka Institute, Pretoria, South Africa
Methods of automated reasoning have solved a large number of problems in Computer Science by using formal
ontologies expressed in logic. Over the years, though, each problem or class of problems has required a different on-
tology, and sometimes a different version of logic. Moreover, the processes of conceiving, controlling and maintaining
an ontology and its versions have turned out to be inherently complex. All this has motivated much investigation
in a wide range of disparate disciplines - from logic-based Knowledge Representation and Reasoning to Software
Engineering, from Databases to Multimedia - about how to relate ontologies to one another.
Just like the previous edition, ARCOE-10 aims at bringing together researchers and practitioners from core areas of
Artificial Intelligence (Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, Contexts, and Ontologies) to discuss these kinds
of problems and relevant results.
Historically, there have been at least three different, yet interdependent motivations behind this type of research:
defining the relationship between an ontology and its context, providing support to ontology engineers, enhancing
problem solving and communication for software agents.
ARCOE Call for Abstracts has been formulated against such historical background. Submissions to ARCOE-10 have
been reviewed by two to three Chairs or PC members and ranked on relevance and quality. Approximately eighty
percent of the submissions have been selected for presentation at the workshop and for inclusion in these Workshop
Notes.
Thanks to the invaluable and much appreciated contributions of its Program Committee, its Invited Speakers
and its authors, ARCOE-10 provides participants with an opportunity to position various approaches with respect
to one another. Hopefully, though the workshop and these Notes will also start a process of cross-pollination and
set out the constitution of a truly interdisciplinary research-community dedicated to automated reasoning about
contexts and ontology evolution.
(Edinburgh, Nanjing, Pretoria – June 2010)
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More About AGM Revision in Description Logics
Ma´rcio Moretto Ribeiro and Renata Wassermann
University of Sa˜o Paulo
{marciomr, renata}@ime.usp.br
1 Introduction
Belief revision studies the dynamics of beliefs defining some oper-
ations in logically closed sets (belief sets): expansion, revision and
contraction. Revision, in particular deals with the problem of accom-
modating consistently a newly received piece of information.
Most of the works on belief revision following the seminal paper
[1] assume that the underlying logic of the agent satisfies some as-
sumptions. In [5] we showed how to apply revision of belief sets to
logics that are not closed under negation. We have, however, assumed
that the logic satisfies a property called distributivity. In the present
work we show a list of description logics that are not closed under
negation and study which of them are distributive.
1.1 AGM paradigm
The most influential work in belief revision is [1]. In this work the
authors defined a number of rationality postulates for contraction
and revision, now known as the AGM postulates. The authors then
showed constructions for these operations and proved that the con-
structions are equivalent to the postulates (representation theorem)
Most works in belief revision assume some properties on the un-
derlying logic: compactness, Tarskianicity, deduction and supraclas-
sicality, which we will refer to as the AGM assumptions. The last
two together are equivalent to the following two properties together
for Tarskian logics:
Definition 1 (distributivity) A logic 〈L , Cn〉 is distributive iff for
all sets of formulasX,Y,W ∈ 2L , we have thatCn(X∪(Cn(Y )∩
Cn(W ))) = Cn(X ∪ Y ) ∩ Cn(X ∪W ).
Definition 2 (closure under negation) A logic 〈L , Cn〉 is closed
under negation iff for all A ∈ 2L there is a B ∈ 2L such that
Cn(A ∪ B) = L and Cn(A) ∩ Cn(B) = Cn(∅). The set B is
then called a negation of A.
AGM revision in non-classical logics: In [5] we argued that some
description logics are not closed under negation and, hence, do not
satisfy the AGM assumptions. Furthermore, the most common way
to define revision is via Levi identity (K ∗α = K−¬α+α), which
assumes the existence of the negation of α. We proposed then a new
construction and a set of postulates for revision for logics that are not
closed under negation.
We used two postulates, borrowed from the belief base literature:
(relevance) If β ∈ K \ K ∗ α then there is K′ such that K ∩
(K ∗ α) ⊆ K′ ⊆ K and K′ ∪ {α} is consistent, but K′ ∪ {α, β} is
inconsistent.
(uniformity) If for all K′ ⊆ K, K′ ∪ {α} is inconsistent iff
K′ ∪ {β} is inconsistent then K ∩K ∗ α = K ∩K ∗ β
The set of rationality postulates we considered is: closure, suc-
cess, inclusion, consistency, relevance and uniformity. The following
proposition is an evidence that this is a good choice of rationality
postulates:
Proposition 3 For logics that satisfy the AGM assumptions, closure,
success, inclusion, consistency, relevance and uniformity are equiv-
alent to the original AGM postulates for revision: closure, success,
consistency, vacuity and extentionality.
We proposed also a construction inspired in some ideas from [4]:
Definition 4 (Maximally consistent set w.r.t α) [4]X ∈ K ↓ α iff
X ⊆ K, X ∪ {α} is consistent and if X ⊂ X ′ ⊆ K then X ′ ∪ {α}
is inconsistent.
Definition 5 (Selection function) [1] A selection function for K is
a function γ such that if K ↓ α 6= ∅, then ∅ 6= γ(K ↓ α) ⊆ K ↓ α.
Otherwise, γ(K ↓ α) = {K}.
The construction of a revision without negation is defined as K ∗γ
α =
⋂
γ(K ↓ α) + α.
We proved that, for distributive logics, this construction is com-
pletely characterized by the set of rationality postulates we are con-
sidering i.e. we proved the representation theorem relating the con-
struction to the set of postulates [5].
1.2 Description Logics
Description logics (DLs) forms a family of formalisms to represent
terminological knowledge. The signature of a description logic is a
tuple 〈NC , NR, NI〉 of concept names, roles names and individual
names of the language [2]. From a signature it is possible to define
complex concepts via a description language. Each DL has its own
description language that admits a certain set of constructors.
The semantic of a DL is defined using an interpretation I =
〈.I ,∆I〉 such that ∆I is a non-empty set called domain and .I is
an interpretation function. For each concept name the interpretation
associates a subset of the domain, for each role name a binary rela-
tion in the domain and for each individual an element of the domain.
The interpretation is then extended to complex concepts.
A sentence in a DL is a restriction to the interpretation. A TBox is a
set of sentences of the form C1 v C2 that restricts the interpretation
of concepts1, an ABox is a set of sentences of the formC(a),R(a, b),





a = b and a 6= b that restricts the interpretation of individuals. Some
DLs, likeALCH, admits also an RBox which is a set of sentences of
the form R v S that restricts the interpretations of roles.
Let Σ = 〈T ,A,R〉 be a tuple where T , A and R are a Tbox, an
ABox and an RBox respectively. A sentence α is a consequence of
Σ (Σ  α or α ∈ Cn(Σ)) iff for all interpretations I if I satisfies Σ
then I satisfies α.
Two characteristics the DLs we are considering that will be impor-
tant in this work are: inALC every sentence in the TBox is equivalent
to a sentence of the form > v C for a concept C [3] and in ALCO
every sentence in the ABox is equivalent to a sentence of the form
> v C.
2 Properties of Description Logics
The main contribution of this work is to show a set of description
logics that are not closed under negation and which of them are dis-
tributive i.e. we show a set of logics such that representation theo-
rem for revision without negation is applicable. It turns out that most
DLs that admits GCI axioms (GCI axioms allow complex concepts
in both sides of the sentence) are not closed under negation, but many
of them are also not distributive.
Classic negation in DLs: We will say that two roles R and S
are unrelated iff neither R v S ∈ Cn(∅) nor S v R ∈ Cn(∅).
The main result of this section proves that if the signature of a DL
〈L , Cn〉 has infinitely many unrelated roles and admits ∀, unionsq, ¬ and
GCI axioms then 〈L , Cn〉 is not closed under negation.
Theorem 6 Consider a DL 〈L , Cn〉 that admits the constructors
¬, ∀, unionsq and general concept inclusion axioms in the TBox. If there
is an infinite number of unrelated roles, then 〈L , Cn〉 is not closed
under negation
The proof of this theorem comes from the fact that if 〈L , Cn〉 ad-
mits unionsq, ¬ then every sentence can be written as> v C and from the
following lemmas:
Lemma 7 Let A and B be concepts such that > v A and > v B
are not tautologies and letR be a role name that is unrelated with any
role that appears inA orB. ThenCn(∅) ⊂ Cn(> v Au∀R.B) ⊆
Cn(> v A) ∩ Cn(> v B).
Lemma 8 If Cn(> v A) = Cn(∅) and > v B is a negation of
> v A then Cn(> v B) = L
As a corollary of this result we have that many well known de-
scription logics are not closed under negation. Hence, for all these
logics the AGM results are not applicable:
Corollary 9 The following DLs are not closed under negation:
ALC, ALCO, ALCH, OWL-lite and OWL-DL.
Distributivity in DLs: In this section we show a list of distributive
and non-distributive DLs. We start with an example showing that the
logic ALC is not distributive in general.
Example 10: Let X = {a = b}, Y = {C(a)} and
Z = {C(b)}, then Cn(Y ) ∩ Cn(Z) = Cn(∅). Hence
C(a) /∈ Cn(X ∪ (Cn(Y ) ∩ Cn(Z))), but C(a) ∈ Cn(X ∪
Y ) ∩ Cn(X ∪ Z).
The example above depends on the existence of the ABox. In fact,
ALC with empty ABox is distributive:
Proposition 11 Consider a DL 〈L , Cn〉 such that for every sen-
tence α ∈ L there is a sentence α′ ∈ L such that Cn(α) =
Cn(α′) and α′ has the form > v C for some concept C. Then
〈L , Cn〉 is distributive.
Since in ALCO the ABox can be written in terms of the TBox,
ALCO is distributive even in the presence of the ABox.
Finally, if we consider a logic 〈L , Cn〉 that admits role hierarchy,
but does not admit role constructors, then 〈L , Cn〉 is not distribu-
tive. Consider the following example:
Example 12: Let X = {R v S1, R v S2}, Y = {S1 v
S3} and Z = {S2 v S3}. We have that Cn(Y ) ∩ Cn(Z) =
Cn(∅). Hence R v S3 /∈ Cn(X ∪ (Cn(Y ) ∩ Cn(Z))), but
R v S3 ∈ Cn(X ∪ Y ) ∩ Cn(X ∪ Z).
Besides ALCH, the logics behind OWL 1 (SHOIN for OWL-
DL and SHIF for OWL-lite), OWL-2 (SROIQ) and the OWL
profiles OWL-RL and OWL-QL admit role hierarchy, but do not ad-
mit role constructors. None of these logics are distributive.
The following table sums up the results of this section:
Description Logic Negation Distributivity
ALC no no
ALC without ABox no yes
ALCO no yes
ALCH, OWL-lite, OWL-DL no no
OWL-QL, OWL-RL and OWL 2 ? no
3 Conclusion and future work
In this work we continued the work started in [5] by showing for
which DLs the AGM revision without negation can be applied. We
showed that most DLs that admits GCIs are not closed under nega-
tion, but most of them are also not distributive. We showed thatALC
with empty TBox and ALCO are two exceptions. These logics are
distributive and not closed under negation. Hence, the representa-
tion theorem presented in [5] holds for ALC with empty ABox and
ALCO.
In addition to that, we showed that the postulates used in [5] are
equivalent to the AGM postulates if the underlying logic satisfies the
AGM assumptions. This is a good evidence that we chose a good set
of rationality postulates.
As future work we should look for a construction that can be char-
acterized by this set of postulates (or a similar one) not only in dis-
tributive, but in any Tarskian compact logic.
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Context and Intention in Ontologies
Richard J. Wallace and Tabbasum Naz 1
1 EXTENDED ABSTRACT
1.1 (Meta-)Context
Ontologies are only useful within a given context. Sometimes this
context is quite specific; sometimes it is broad-based or generic.
In many cases, the context of an ontology can be described as
the intention of that ontology. In fact, most practical ontologies are
used for a specific purpose, and this intentionality is usually reflected
throughout their organisation. This includes the concepts defined, the
division of superordinate concepts into subordinate categories, and
the properties that are specified.
However, more often than not this purpose remains implicit. It may
not even be expressed in any of the concepts in the ontology. More
significantly, the relevance of a given concept with respect to the pur-
pose of the ontology is never specified in a clear, unambiguous fash-
ion. Instead, concepts are apparently included (or excluded) on the
basis of intuition and trial-and-error.
More generally, the implications of intentionality for ontology or-
ganisation are not clear and have never been spelled out.
1.2 An example
The first example is taken from the travel domain. Portions of
two independently created ontologies are shown in Figure 1. The
”Tourism” ontology (left panel in figure) was developed for Seman-
tic Web sites related to tourism [4]. The ”e-tourism” ontology, also
known as ”OnTour” (right-hand panel) is part of a Web assistant to
aid users searching for vacation packages [7]. Despite the similarity
of domain and intention, the ontologies are strikingly different. The
concept hierarchies are quite dissimiliar, as are the properties defined
(not shown in figure).
1.3 Issues raised by this example
The tourism example shows how extensive differences in ontology
organisation can be when the intention is (apparently) the same.
It should also be noted that in neither case is the purpose, or inten-
tion, of the ontology explicitly represented. Thus, there is no concept
of a trip or of planning a trip. There is also an issue of the level
or generality of a concept. For example the e-tourism ontology has
<Ticket>, <Location>, <DateTime>, and <ContactData> at the
same level in the ontology, but these concepts differ greatly in ab-
straction.
More importantly, these concepts have very different relations to
the activity of aiding tourists or searching for vacation packages.
Some, like <Location> and <DateTime>, are general concepts
associated with basic ‘stage setting’, while others like <Ticket>,
1 Cork Constraint Computation Centre, University College Cork, Cork, Ire-
land, email: r.wallace@4c.ucc.ie,t naz2001@yahoo.com
Figure 1. Portions of two ontologies developed independently for the
travel domain.
<Event>, and <ContactData> are associated with specific roles in
the activity that the ontology is meant to support.
In general, when perusing these ontologies, one has the sense of an
overall lack of coherence, although at present it is difficult to specify
what form this coherence should take. This, in fact, is the problem
that the present research will attempt to address.
1.4 Existing and other possible approaches
 Meta-ontology of intentions: given ontology as an individual be-
longing to some class of intentions.
Example: In the Ontology Metadata Vocabulary (OMV)[5],
the concept <OntologyTask> contains information
about the task the ontology was intended to be used
for. <OntologyTask> has further pre-defined tasks i.e.
<AnnotationTask>, <MatchingTask>, <IntegrationTask>,
<QueryFormulationTask>, etc.
(In our view, there is something awkward and inept about this ap-
proach, as if the machinery of ontologies was being taken off the
shelf and put to use in a rote, unthinking fashion.)
 Intentionality might be specified by means of top-level con-
cepts. This might involve a database-view approach, based on the
class/subclass relations in the full ontology.
1.5 Present approach
We begin with the question: Is intention a well-defined concept? So
that dealing with it is a well-defined problem? In fact, there is a liter-
ature of some proportions in philosophy that deals with this question.
ARCOE-10 Workshop Notes
9
In particular, the work of Bratman [1] includes an extensive discus-
sion of this topic. And it is his definition that we will use. Therefore,
we consider the idea of intention as bound up with the creation of a
plan.
Thus, we approach ontology construction as if we were building
a plan. This means that we must start by defining the goal. The goal
will be one of the concepts in the ontology.
It seems most natural to use the HTN style of planning [9], in
which a major action is plan decomposition. An example is shown
below for the tourism domain. Here, the goal is to support trip-
planning. This goal is then decomposed into subgoals; alternatively,
we can think of a basic action trip-planning, decomposed into com-
ponent actions. (Note that <trip> is not included in either of the on-






Figure 2. Top level of plan for tourism ontology.
In each case, we assume a mapping between an action and a con-
cept. We also map in the same way between preconditions as well as
from effects to concepts. This is basically how we build our ontology.
This may also give us a way of evaluating the completeness of
the ontology. That is, an ontology is complete only if it is associated
with a set of actions, etc. that can accomplish the basic goal, which
represents the intention of the ontology.
Many details remain to be worked out, e.g. how to guide the user in
the planning process, how to update and revise the growing ontology,
the relation, if any, of the plan structure to the structure of the ontol-
ogy, and how to set up properties appropriately (the precondition-
action-effect relations may help to guide this aspect of ontology
building). We must also explore the various forms of abstraction in
planning [8] to see if they have any bearing in this context.
As part of the process of elaborating, and checking, our ideas, we
are building a system for ontology planning, tentatively called On-
toPlanner. Currently, the basic scheme of operation that we envis-
age is to (i) parse the predicates used in plan construction to obtain
nouns and verbs which indicate relevant concepts, (ii) characterise
or ‘locate’ the concepts via a top-level ontology, (iii) introduce these
concepts and possibly related concepts and properties into the devel-
oping ontology.
1.6 Further issues
 Most ontologies incorporate more than one intention - usually nec-
essary (just as an automobile or a mobile phone incorporates more
than one intention).
 Intentionality has implications for merging ontologies, again
which have not been worked out. Merging and matching might
well be facilitated if the intentionality of each ontology had an
explicit representation.
 Characterising an ontology with respect to intentions. Here, a pos-
sible approach is to create a partial order based on intentions, i.e.
lattice structure, in order to locate an ontology within a lattice of
ontologies. The supremum might be all the intentions for that lat-
tice.
 Historical aspects of ontologies, i.e. developing/emerging inten-
tions.
 Intentions and agents (esp. BDI agents). Explicit intentions may
enhance the accessibility of an ontology to software agents.
1.7 Unrelated Work.
There are many papers unrelated to the present work. Here, our con-
cern is with those cases where this might not be recognised. An ob-
vious example is the development of ontologies that are meant to
be used in connection with planning. This topic has received a fair
amount of attention during the past few years. In fact, a recent ICAPS
workshop was devoted to this topic [2]. More recently, Jingge et al.
have discussed how to combine ontologies with HTN planning [3].
It should be obvious that this work has little or nothing in common
with the present work, whose purpose is to guide ontology building
rather than to provide a planner with domain knowledge.
A second type of unrelated work is concerned with developing on-
tologies to characterise the general planning process. Here, the only
example that we are aware of is a paper by Rajpathak and Motta [6].
Although this seems less distantly related to our concerns than the
works cited above, it should be clear that the purpose of this ontol-
ogy, which is to aid planning at a generic level, is not what we have
described in this paper. Nonetheless, although the intention in quite
different in the two cases, an ontology of plans may be useful in the
present context.
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Reasoning with Embedded Formulas and Modalities
in SUMO1
Benzmu¨ller Christoph and Pease Adam2
Abstract. Reasoning with embedded formulas is relevant for the
SUMO ontology but there is limited automation support so far. We
investigate whether higher-order automated theorem provers are ap-
plicable for the task. Moreover, we point to a challenge that we have
revealed as part of our experiments: modal operators in SUMO are
in conflict with Boolean extensionality. A solution is proposed.
1 EMBEDDED FORMULAS IN SUMO
The open source Suggested Upper Merged Ontology3 (SUMO) [9]
(and similarly, proprietary Cyc [13]) contains a small but significant
amount of higher-order representations. The approach taken in these
systems to address higher-order challenges has been to employ spe-
cific translation ’tricks’, possibly in combination or in addition to
some pre-processing techniques. Examples of such means are the
quoting techniques for embedded formulas as employed in SUMO
[11] and the heuristic-level modules in CYC [13]. Unfortunately,
however, these solutions are strongly limited. The effect is that many
desirable inferences are currently not supported, so that many rele-
vant queries cannot be answered.
This includes statements in which formulas are embedded as argu-
ments of terms, for example, statements that employ epistemic op-
erators such as believes or knows, temporal operators such as
holdsDuring, and further operators such as disapproves or
hasPurpose. While first-order automated theorem proving (FO-
ATP) for SUMO has strongly improved recently [12], there is still
only very limited support for reasoning with non-trivial embedded
formulas; we give an example (free variables in premises are univer-
sal and those in the query are existential):
Ex. 1 (Reasoning in temporal contexts.) What holds that holds at
all times. Mary likes Bill.4 During 2009 Sue liked whoever Mary
liked. Is there a year in which Sue has liked somebody?
A: (=> ?P (holdsDuring ?Y ?P))
B: (lk Mary Bill)
C: (holdsDuring (YearFn 2009)
(forall (?X) (=> (lk Mary ?X) (lk Sue ?X))))
Q: (holdsDuring (YearFn ?Y) (lk Sue ?X))
This example, which is a challenge for FO-ATP (note the embedded
first-order formula), is actually trivial for higher-order automated the-
orem provers (HO-ATP): the prover LEO-II [5] can solve it in 0.16
1 This work is funded by the German Research Foundation under grant BE
2501/6-1.
2 Articulate Software, email: cbenzmueller|apease@articulatesoftware.com
3 SUMO is available at http://www.ontologyportal.org
4 To save space ’likes’ is written as ’lk’.
sec. on a standard MacBook. A slight modification of Ex.1, which
LEO-II proves in 0.08 sec., is:5
Ex. 2 (Ex.1 modified; A is replaced by ’True always holds’.)
A’: (holdsDuring ?Y True)
B: (lk Mary Bill)
C: (holdsDuring (YearFn 2009)
(forall (?X) (=> (lk Mary ?X) (lk Sue ?X))))
Q: (holdsDuring (YearFn ?Y) (lk Sue ?X))
Further examples are studied in [6]; there we also outline the transla-
tion from SUMO’s SUO-KIF representation language [10, 7] as used
above to the new higher-order TPTP THF syntax [14] as supported
by several HO-ATPs including LEO-II.
2 THE PROBLEMWITH MODAL OPERATORS
Validity of Ex.1 and Ex.2 is easily shown provided that Boolean ex-
tensionality6 is assumed (this ensures that the denotation of each for-
mula, also the embedded ones, is either true of false). This assump-
tion has actually never been questioned for SUMO, neither in [7] nor
in [10].
However, this assumption also leads to problematic effects as the
following slight modification of Ex.2 illustrates:
Ex. 3 (Ex.2 modified; now formulated for an epistimec context)
A”: (knows ?Y True)
B: (lk Mary Bill)
C’: (knows Chris
(forall (?X) (=> (lk Mary ?X) (lk Sue ?X)))
Q’: (knows Chris (lk Sue Bill))
Using Boolean extensionality the query is easily shown valid and
LEO-II can prove it in 0.04 sec. However, now this inference is dis-
turbing since we have not explicitly required that (knows Chris (lk
Mary Bill)) holds which intuitively seems mandatory. Hence, we here
(re-)discover an issue that some logicians possibly claim as widely
known: modalities have to be treated with great care in classical, ex-
tensional higher-order logic. Our ongoing work therefore studies how
we can suitably adapt the modeling of affected modalities in SUMO
in order to appropriately address this issue. A respective proposal is
sketched next.
5 It is important to note that True in A’ can actually be replaced by other
tautologies, e.g. by (equalMaryMary); this may appear more natural
and the example can still be proved by LEO-II in milliseconds.
6 For a detailed discussion of functional and Boolean extensionality in clas-
sical higher-order logic we refer to [2].
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3 REASONINGWITH MODALITIES IN SUMO
The solution we currently explore is to treat SUMO reasoning prob-
lems hat involve modal operators as problems in quantified multi-
modal logics. Unfortunately there are only very few direct theorem
provers for quantified multimodal logics available. We therefore ex-
ploit our recent embedding of quantified multimodal logics in clas-
sical higher-order logic [4, 3] and we investigate whether this em-
bedding can fruitfully support the automation of modal operators in
SUMO with off-the-shelf HO-ATPs (cf. [1] for first studies).
The idea of the embedding is simple: modal formulas are lifted to
predicates over possible worlds, i.e. HO-terms of type ι  o, where
ι is a reserved base type denoting the set of possible worlds. For
individuals we reserve a second base type µ.7
Modal operators such as >, ⊥, ¬ , ∨ , ⊃ , 2 , and
∀ind, ∀prop are then simply defined as abbreviations of
proper HO-terms, e.g. ¬ = λφιo λWι ¬φW and 2 =
λRιιo λφιo λWι ∀Vι ¬RW V ∨ φV . In the following we
write 2r for the application of 2 to an accessibility relation r of
type ι  ι  o.8
Exploiting this embedding we can now suitably map SUMO
problems containing modal operators: e.g. C’ in Ex. 3 is lifted to
(2Chris ∀indXµ ((lkMary X) ⊃ (lk SueX)))ιo and B sim-
ply becomes (lkMary Bill)ιo. Since 2 is here associated with
knowledge we axiomatize it as an S4 or S5 modality below. Simi-
larly, we could introduce further copies of 2, e.g. for believes, and
provide different axioms for it.
The final step is to ground the lifted terms. For
this, T-Box like information in SUMO, such as the ax-
iom (instance instance BinaryPredicate), is inter-
preted as universally quantified over all possible worlds:
∀Wι ((instance instance BinaryPredicate) W ). A-Box
like information and queries in contrast are modeled with respect
to a current world cw (of type ι). Since our examples only contain
local premises and queries, i.e. A-Box like information, Ex.3 is thus
translated as:
Ex. 4 (Translated Ex.3)
A”: ∀Yιιo ((2Y >) cw)
B: ((lk Mary Bill) cw)
C’: ((2Chris (∀indXµ ((lk Mary X) ⊃ (lk Sue X)))) cw)
Q’: ((2Chris (lk Sue Bill)) cw)
The axioms for S4 (T+4) or S5 (T+5) can be added as follows:
T: ∀Wι, Yιιo ((∀propφιo 2Y φ ⊃ φ) W )
4: ∀Wι, Yιιo ((∀propφιo 2Y φ ⊃ 2Y 2Y φ) W )
5: ∀Wι, Yιιo ((∀propφιo 2Y ¬φ ⊃ 2Y ¬2Y φ) W )
The above example is not valid, which we wanted to achieve, and
LEO-II correctly fails to prove it (timeout). However, if we move
premise B in the context of Chris’ knowledge then we get:
Ex. 5 (Modified Ex.4)
A”: ∀Yιιo ((2Y >) cw)
B’: ((2Chris (lk Mary Bill)) cw)
C’: ((2Chris (∀indXµ ((lk Mary X) ⊃ (lk Sue X)))) cw)
Q’: ((2Chris (lk Sue Bill)) cw)
Ex.5 is valid and it is proved by LEO-II in less than 0.15 sec.
7 In [4] we use µ for possible worlds and ι for individuals; this syntactic
switch is completely unproplematic.
8 Note the elegant way in which indexation over different accessibility rela-
tions is facilitated via λ-abstraction in the definition of 2 ; this is the basis
for combining different 2k operators in our framework; cf. [1].
4 CONCLUSION
Reasoning with embedded formulas is naturally supported in exten-
sional HO-ATPs. However, this leads to a problem regarding the ad-
equate treatment of modal operators. A potential solution has been
outlined in this paper that we are currently investigating further. Our
ongoing work in particular studies the scalability of HO-ATPs for
the task. Due to the recent, strong improvements of HO-ATPs [14] –
which will be further fostered by the new higher-order CASC compe-
titions – we are quite optimistic though. The large theories challenge
obviously requires the development or adaptation of strong relevance
filters, such as SInE [8], to our higher-order logic setting.
We have to admit that we currently see few alternatives to
HO-ATP for the automation of ontology reasoning problems
with embedded formulas and modalities as presented in this paper
and already our toy examples seem challenging for other approaches.
Acknowledgment: We would like to thank Geoff Sutcliffe and
Larry Paulson for their support and their contributions to our work.
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1 Introduction
An ontology is a description of a particular domain in terms of its
concepts and relationships. Ontologies can be used by ‘intelligent
agents’ to model their environment and communicate with other
agents. The quality of ontologies are therefore crucial to the per-
formance of intelligent agents. However, as with any other knowl-
edge base, there is always the possibility that an ontology have some
semantic defects. This abstract presents an approach to ontology
debugging using ideas borrowed from Truth Maintenance Systems
(TMS).
2 Ontology Debugging
This section briefly introduces the key problems in ontology debug-
ging and briefly outlines some of the major work in the field. Firstly,
we provide basic definitions of incoherence and inconsistency of a
DL-based ontology.
Definition 1. An ontology is incoherent iff there is at least one un-
satisfiable concept in its TBox.
Definition 2. An ontology is inconsistent iff there is no model for it.
Generally speaking, the incoherence problem deals with concept-
unsatisfiabilty within the TBox while an inconsistency problem also
involves assertional axioms.2 Ontology debugging is the process of
identifying bugs and producing repair plans for an incoherent or in-
consistent ontology. Most work has been done in ontology debugging
is for the incoherence problem (i.e., debugging and repair of unsatis-
fiable concepts) although recently the problem of inconsistency has
also been investigated.
Basically, the process of debugging ontology has two parts. The
first is to identify which sets of axioms (or parts of axioms) are re-
sponsible for an unsatisfiable concept or an inconsistency. The next
step is to propose how can these axioms be modified to make the
concept satisfiable, or to restore consistency to the Knowledge Base
(KB) with respect to some particular criteria.
Two main approaches to pinpointing problematic axioms have
been proposed in the literature: glass-box and black-box. Glass-box
methods, e.g., [6, 7, 8, 9], use tableau-like rules to pinpoint the prob-
lematic axioms (concepts). These approaches obviously depend on a
particular DL, as they have to modify the tableau rules to store and
retrieve the sources of errors. Black-box methods on the other hand,
1 School of Computer Science, University of Nottingham UK, {hhn,nza,bsl}
@cs.nott.ac.uk
2 Note that the satisfiability checking problem in TBox can be reduced to a
consistency checking problem by trying to construct a model for a concept
using tableau rules.
e.g., [6, 11, 4], are reasoner-independent, since they only use the rea-
soner as an external component to diagnose whether an a concept is
satisfiable with respect to a particular T-Box (or KB in the case of
inconsistency problem). There are also hybrid approaches, e.g., [5],
which combine both glass box and black box approaches.
In this paper, the rules which we employ to create the dependency
graph are similar to the classical tableau rules, as in some of the glass-
box approaches, e.g.,[7, 8].
3 Truth Maintenance Systems
Truth Maintenance Systems (TMS), e.g., [3], also known as Belief
Revision Systems or Reason Maintenance Systems, play a central
role in a style of belief revision called foundational belief revision.
A TMS keeps track of dependencies between data to maintain the
consistency of a database. A TMS consists of a set datum nodes
and the justifications for them. A justification can be considered as a
record of an inference, linking a datum node with the datum nodes
used to derive it. Using these recorded dependencies, a TMS allows a
problem-solver to quickly determine which nodes are “responsible”
for belief in a particular datum.
According to [10], a TMS performs three main tasks: 1) given an
assertion, find the assertions or assumptions used to derive it; 2) given
a set of assumptions, find all the assertions can be derived from them;
and 3) delete an assertion and all the consequences which have been
derived from it. These tasks are also relevant to the problem of on-
tology debugging. For example, tracing the sources S1 and S2 of the
assertions A(x) and ¬A(x), where A is a concept name and x is
an individual in the ontology, gives the source of the contradiction
(or clash) S1 ∪ S2. Similarly, if one can find a minimal set of as-
sumptions from which the contradictory assertions were derived, the
minimal set of axioms which are the cause for the clash can also be
identified.3 This set corresponds to a MUPS in [9], or a justification
for concept unsatisfiability defined in [5].
4 Using ATMS for Ontology Debugging
One particular type of TMS is an Assumption-based TMS (ATMS)
[1]. In an ATMS, each node is associated with the set of sets of as-
sumptions used to derive it, as well as the datum nodes that constitute
its immediate antecedents. These sets of assumptions are termed en-
vironments, and are always kept minimal and consistent. In this way,
backtracking is avoided and multiple solutions can be found at the
same time.
3 In the literature of ontology debugging, the idea of tagging an assertion with
the axioms used to derive it has also been proposed in [7, 8].
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In this section, we present an approach to ontology debugging us-
ing an ATMS. We focus on the problem of axiom pinpointing for an
unsatisfiable concept (i.e., finding a set of axioms responsible for a
unsatisfiably concept), and for simplicity, we only consider the un-
foldableALC TBOX without disjunctions.4 We show how the ATMS
can be used to detect contradictions and to pinpoint sets of problem-
atic axioms.
As a reasoner can easily detect that a concept is unsatisfiable by
a satisfiability check, the key problem is to identify the sources of
the unsatisfiability. This is the task of the ATMS. An ATMS node
Ndatum is of the form: 〈datum, label , justifications〉, where da-
tum is an assertion such as Ai(a), label is a set of environments
(explained below), and justifications are the sets of nodes that di-
rectly derive Ndatum. Since there are many ways a datum can be
derived, it is possible to have multiple justifications for a particular
node. The ATMS distinguishes two special types of datum nodes:
assumptions and premises. Assumptions are foundational data. Each
environment in the label of a (non-assumption) datum node com-
prises a set of assumptions from which the datum can consistently be
derived. Premises are similar to assumptions, but are taken to hold
universally, and are not explicitly represented in environments. The
task of the ATMS is to ensure that each node label is consistent,
sound, complete and minimal. As the reasoner informs the ATMS
of new datum nodes and justifications, the ATMS label propagation
algorithms update the labels of previously asserted nodes to remove
any subsumed environments (in the case of a normal justification),
or any environments which subsume an environment (in the case of
a new justification for the distinguished node N⊥ which represents
contradiction).
The ontology debugging problem can be mapped onto the opera-
tions of the ATMS in a straightforward way. Each TBOX axiom is
represented by an ATMS assumption. For concreteness, we assume a
TBOX Γ = {ax1, . . . , axn}, where each axiom axi is of the form:
Ai v Ci and all concept descriptions are in negation normal form
(NNF). The assumption that each concept is non-empty, e.g., Ai(c)
for some constant c, is represented by an ATMS premise. The rea-
soner uses standard rules of inference to infer new concept instances
from some consistent set of datum nodes (i.e., nodes whose labels do
not subsume the label ofN⊥). A suitable list of rules that can be used
by the reasoner to infer new justifications is shown in Figure 1. The
process of creating the dependency graph terminates when no rule
can be applied to any node of the graph. At this point, each environ-
ment of a node Ndatum is a minimal set of axioms that can used to
derive datum, and the label of N⊥ consists of sets of axioms respon-
sible for clashes. In addition, the information given by justifications
for nodes can be used to pinpoint the parts of axioms , e.g., concepts
causing the clashes.
In conclusion, there is a clear mapping between the functionality
provided by the ATMS and the problems of ontology debugging, and
we believe that a systematic investigation of the practicality of using
an ATMS for ontology debugging is a fruitful direction for future
research.
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v-rule If the current node is NAi(a) :< Ai(a), L, J > and
Ai v Ci ∈ Γ, then create a new node
NCi(a) :< Ci(a), L
′, {(Ai(a))} >
where L′ = {e ∪ {axi}|e ∈ L}
If NCi(a) exists, update its label and justifications.
LCi(a) = LCi(a) ∪ L′;
JCi(a) = JCi(a) ∪ {(Ai(a))}.
u-rule If the current node is
NCi(a)uCj(a) :< Ci(a) u Cj(a), L, J >, then
create 2 new nodes
NCi(a) :< Ci(a), L, {(Ci(a) u Cj(a))} >
NCj(a) :< Cj(a), L, {(Ci(a) u Cj(a))} >
if they exist, update their labels and justifications.
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Ns(a,b) :< s(a, b), L, {(∃s.C)(a)} >
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∀-rule If the current node is
N(∀s.C)(a) :< (∀s.C)(a), L, J > then
if there exists Ns(a,b), create a node
NC(b) :< C(b), L, {((∀s.C)(a), s(a, b))} >
⊥-rule If there exist 2 nodes
NAi(a) :< Ai(a), L1, J1 >
N¬Ai(a) :< ¬Ai(a), L2, J2 >
in the graph, then create a new node
N⊥ :<⊥, {e1 ∪ e2|e1 ∈ L1, e2 ∈ L2}, {j1 ∪ j2|j1 ∈
J1, j2 ∈ J2} >.
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tification:
L⊥ = L⊥ ∪ {e1 ∪ e2|e1 ∈ L1, e2 ∈ L2}
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Figure 1. Rules for creating and updating nodes in the dependency graph
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Qualitative Causal Analysis of Empirical Knowledge for
Ontology Evolution in Physics
Jos Lehmann1 and Alan Bundy2 and Michael Chan3
1 INTRODUCTION
Ontology evolution and its automation are key factors for achieving
software’s flexibility and adaptability. In the approach to automated
ontology evolution adopted in the GALILEO4 project, progress in
physics is modelled as a process of ontology evolution. An overview
of the approach is provided in Section 2. Section 3 shows that the
construction and the modification of qualitative causal models of ex-
perimental set-ups make it possible to gain information about the
quantities that appear in an equation and contribute to creating the
logical conditions for the equation to evolve.
2 ONTOLOGY REPAIR PLANS
In the framework of the GALILEO project a number of so-calledOn-
tology Repair Plans (ORPs) are being developed and implemented in
higher-order logic [1]. ORPs detect and resolve a contradiction be-
tween two or more ontologies. In ORPs developed thus far, one of
the ontologies represents a theory while the second ontology rep-
resents a sensory or experimental set-up for that theory. When the
sensory ontology generates a theorem that contradicts a theorem of
the theoretical ontology, an ORP is triggered which amends the two
ontologies according to the observations. The development of ORPs
is inspired by cases in the history of physics. So far, a few ORPs have
been developed from a number of development cases, which reflect
common strategies used in physics to cope with contradictory evi-
dence. One of the ORPs is calledWhere is my stuff? (WMS) and was
inspired by the discovery of latent heat.
Until the second half of the 18th century, the chemical/physical
notion of heat was conflated with the notion of temperature and it
was seen as a function of time – or of a temporal quantity, e.g. flow.
Flow was defined as occurring when two physical bodies at different
temperatures are in direct contact with one another. Equation 1 is a
rational reconstruction5 of this pre-modern view:
Q = m×∆t (1)
where Q is the heat, measured by temperature, of a physical body,
m is the mass of the body,∆t is the flow of heat, measured by time,
from the hotter to the cooler object.
Around 1761 Joseph Black observed that (i) ice melts at constant
temperature and (ii) the time required to melt a pound of ice is 140
1 University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom, email: jlehmann@inf.ed.ac.uk
2 University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom, email: bundy@inf.ed.ac.uk
3 University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom, email: mchan@inf.ed.ac.uk
4 Guided Analysis of Logical Inconsistencies Leads to Evolved Ontologies
5 At the time the theory of heat was not expressed in mathematical equations.
times greater than the time required to raise a pound of water one
degree in its temperature, both the ice and the water receiving the
heat equally fast. This observation required to distinguish heat from
temperature, thus ultimately change the very meaning of the quantity
Q. Equation 1 evolved into:
Q = m×∆T +m× L (2)
where Q is the heat put into or taken out of the body, m is the mass
of the body,∆T is the change in temperature, L is the specific latent
heat required by a given substance during its phase transitions.
WMS’s logical infrastructure emulates part of the evolution from
Equation 1 to Equation 2 and adds to Equation 1 a component for
the heat transfered during phase transitions. The equation for such
intermediary theory would be: Q = m ×∆t + Qphase−transition.
Such addition-strategy is found in other cases in physics, e.g. the
postulation of dark matter or of planets to account for unpredictable
yet observed gravitational behaviour in galaxies or, resp., in planetary
sytems.
3 FROM THEORIES TO EXPERIMENTS
An aspect of the evolution of a physics theory that needs to be clari-
fied is how the experimental set-up represented by the sensory ontol-
ogy comes to produce evidence that contradicts the expectations of
the theoretical ontology.
To this end a causal model of an experimental set-up for Equa-
tion 1 is discussed here. In particular, given the qualitative causal
model shown in Figure 1, a new model is derived (Figure 2) based
on principles 1 to 3 (see below). Running simulations on both mod-
els provides information (Figure 3) about the quantities that appear
in the equation and create the conditions for the equation to evolve.
The causal models for Equation 1 are based on Qualitative Pro-
cess Theory (QPT) [2], which allows to simulate the behaviour
of a system through the explicit representation of causal relations
between its quantities. The models and the results of the simula-
tions were produced using a QTP-based tool called Garp3 (available
on http://hcs.science.uva.nl/QRM/). In Garp3 terminology, a QPT
model consists of a number of model fragments that describe their
own sufficient or necessary conditions (in red resp. blue in the fig-
ures). Such fragments consist of entity types and relations between
them, such asContainer, Substance andContains. Entities types
have quantities, the value of which is a combination of their positive
or negativemagnitude on a qualitative scale6 and of a positive or neg-
6 The qualitative values for Temperature are named after phases. A phase
Freeze melt is included between points Frozen and Melted to reflect
the state of knowledge at the time of Equation 1: it was believed that tem-
perature would change during phase transitions, which requires an interval
between the solid and the liquid phases.
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Figure 1. Process Heat flow: model of experimental set-up for Equation 1
ative derivative (δ) that indicates whether the quantity is changing in
magnitude. On the other hand, complex fragments represent dynamic
features as a combination of causal relations and constraints on the
quantities of the entities. Causal relationships come in two flavours:
• influences, I+(Cause,Effect) and I−(Cause,Effect),
direct resp. inverse, indicate that the effect quantity
changes if the cause quantity is non zero; examples in
Figure 1 are I+(Flow(H s), T emperature(Sub)) and
I−(Flow(H s), T emperature(H s)).
• proportionalities, P+(Cause,Effect) and
P−(Cause,Effect), direct resp. inverse, indicate that the
effect quantity changes if the cause quantity changes; examples
in Figure 1 are P+(Temperature(H s), F low(H s)) and
P−(Temperature(Sub), F low(H s)).
A scenario is a description of a state containing instances of the
entities described in the model fragments. In Figure 3, for instance,
H2O, for which the temperature value histories are plotted, instanti-
ates the variable Sub of type Substance of Figures 1 and 2; Sto1
(for stove) instantiates H s of type Heat source. Given a QPT
model of a system and a scenario, the qualitative simulation engine
calculates the sequence of states that follow from the scenario, or-
ganising them in alternative sequences whenever the model contains
ambiguities which allow for branching. One way of visualising a sin-
gle sequence is through the value histories, as in Figure 3.
Figure 2. Process Melting: modified model of experimental set-up for
Equation 1
Figure 3. Left: value history for processHeat flow consisting of 2 states.
Right: two alternative value histories for process Melting, consisting of 6
resp. 4 states. The 6-states simulation envisions an interruption of the temper-
ature rise, the 4-states matches the prediction of Equation 1
In order to test Equation 1 against phase changes the process
Heat flow shown in Figure 1 needs to be modified into the pro-
cessMelting, which includes as a preconditionHeat flow (which
is grayed-out Figure 2). Melting is activated for Frozen <
Temperature(Sub) < Melted and includes quantities for phases
(Amount of solid and Amount of liquid) in order to observe
Equation 1 at work during phase changes. These are phenomenolog-
ical quantities, not included in the original equation, and their causal
role in the modified model should be neutral from an energetic view-
point, their insertion in the model should be based on the following
three principles:
1. changes in their values should be direct effects of the cause quan-
tity (i.e. Flow);
2. they should indirectly affect the effect quantity (i.e.
Temperature);
3. they should exert an opposite indirect causal influence on the
cause quantity with respect to the influence exerted on it by the
effect quantity.
These changes to the process Heat flow create an ambiguity in
the model for the quantity Temperature, which during the pro-
cess Melting is at the same time positively directly influenced by
Flow and indirectly negatively proportional to it. Such ambiguity is
reflected in the two alternative simulations produced by the modi-
fied model (Figure 3). The first simulation envisions an interruption
of the temperature rise, whereas the second matches the prediction
based on Equation 1. The very creation of the ambiguity through the
modification steps 1 to 3 above sheds light on how the contradiction
between the theoretical and the sensory ontology is generated.
REFERENCES
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Uncertainty Reasoning through Similarity in Context
Claudia d’Amato and Nicola Fanizzi1
1 SIMILARITY, INDUCTION & CONTEXTS
Purely deductive and logic-based methods for semantic knowledge
bases (KBs) expressed in Description Logics (DLs) may fall short
due to the heterogeneity of the data-sources and the inherent incom-
pleteness. Inductive methods may be better suited, as they are often
both efficient and noise-tolerant. In particular, methods grounded in
similarity have been proposed to provide viable and robust methods
for many difficult tasks, casting them as inductive problems [3, 7].
Many inductive methods for ontologies expressed in DL-based
languages are rely on a notion of similarity or distance [13]. Most
of the measures in the literature focus on concept-similarity [1].
However, instance-based reasoning techniques borrowed from Ma-
chine Learning require a notion of similarity between individuals.
Some measures for specific DLs have been proposed [2, 4] they are
still partly based on structural criteria (a notion of normal form)
which determine their main weakness: language-dependence. To
overcome these limitations, language-independent measures for in-
dividuals based on their behavior w.r.t. a committee of features (ex-
pressed as DL concepts), say C = {F1, F2, . . . , Fm}, which acts as
context of reference [10, 11]. The rationale was that a context stands
as a group of discriminating features.
Formally, a family of semantic metrics for individuals, inspired to
Minkowski’s norms, was defined as follows [6, 3]:
Given a context C = {F1, F2, . . . , Fm} for the KB K = (T ,A),
a family of dissimilarity functions for individuals occurring in the
ABox A (Ind(A)) is defined dCp : Ind(A)× Ind(A) 7→ [0, 1] with
∀a, b ∈ Ind(A) : dCp(a, b) = p
√∑m
i=1 |δi(a, b)|p,
where p > 0 and the ith-dissimilarity function δi is defined by:
δi(a, b)=
{
0 [K|=Fi(a) ∧ K|=Fi(b)] ∨ [K|=¬Fi(a) ∧ K|=¬Fi(b)]
1 [K|=Fi(a) ∧ K|=¬Fi(b)] ∨ [K|=¬Fi(a) ∧ K|=Fi(b)]
ui otherwise
Here ui stands for the uncertainty related to the i-th feature. In lack
of prior knowledge, the features are assumed to have uniform priors.
2 LEARNING CONTEXTS
The choice of suitable context is important for the similarity assess-
ment. Depending on their number, one may adopt (a subset of) the
concepts defined in the KB or features can be generated ad hoc in
advance. Indeed, some features may likely have a higher discrimi-
nating power w.r.t. the others, then they should turn out to be more
relevant in determining the similarity of the individuals in a given
context. Moving from this observation, an extension of the measures
proposed in [6] is presented, where each feature of the committee
may be weighted on the grounds of the amount of information it
conveys [3].
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In [6, 7], we propose feature selection methods based on stochastic
search which can be employed to determining a context that is able
to properly discriminate the individual resources. Encoding a given
criterion in a fitness function, the methods perform a randomized
search through customized versions of well known algorithms (e.g.
simulated annealing or genetic programming).
Even more so, once the context of features has been produced,
each concept may give a different contribution to the similarity. That
is why normally the values of the dissimilarity measures in the met-
rics δi are generally weighted: the more they can split the given in-
stances in an original way the higher this weight (then they are also
normalized). The ability of splitting the individuals has been mea-
sured in terms of the related entropy or by recurring to a measure of
their sample variance.
3 APPLICATIONS
We present two applications: one concerns the usage of contextual
similarity to perform inductive classification; the second allows for
the definition and reasoning with vague concepts.
3.1 A Distance-based Classification Method
Individual classification or search through a k-NN method [13] has
been customized for DLs [2, 3]. The method is ascribed to the cate-
gory of lazy instance-based learning, since the mere learning phase
is reduced to memorizing examples and counter-examples of the tar-
get concept. Then, during the classification phase, a new instance is
classified in analogy with its neighbors.
More formally, the method aims at inducing an approximation for
a hypothesis function h ranging in a set of values V = {v1, . . . , vs}
standing for the (disjoint) cases to be predicted. Normally a limited
number of training instances is needed for the classification, espe-
cially if they are prototypical for a region of the instance space. Let
xq be the query instance whose membership w.r.t. some query con-
cept is to be determined. Using a metric, the set of the k nearest train-
ing instances w.r.t. xq is selected: NN(xq) = {xi | i = 1, . . . , k}.
Then the k-NN procedure approximates h for classifying xq on the
grounds of the value that h assumes for the instances in NN(xq).
The estimated value for h(xq) is decided through a weighted major-






where the function I returns 1 in case of matching arguments and 0
otherwise. We adopt the set V = {−1, 0,+1}, where +1 stands for
membership, −1 for non-membership, and 0 for uncertainty.
Note that, being this procedure based on a majority vote of the in-
dividuals in the neighborhood, it is less error-prone in case of noise
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in the data (e.g. incorrect assertions) w.r.t. a purely logic deductive
procedure. Therefore it may be able to give a correct classification
even in case of inconsistent assertions. Obviously the procedure can
be forced to give a positive/negative answer providing training indi-
viduals labeled with values ±1 only.
Similar approaches have been followed for deriving semantic
kernels encoding aspects of contextual similarity used for non-
parametric statistical learning [9].
3.2 Representing Vague Concepts in Rough DL
Modeling vague concepts has often been tackled through numeric
approaches. A drawback of these approaches is that uncertainty
is introduced in the model, which often has the consequence that
crisp answers to queries cannot be returned. Rough DLs [12] intro-
duced a mechanism that allows for modeling vague knowledge by
means of a crisp specification of approximations of a concept. Two
crisp concepts can approximate an underspecified concept as sub-
/super-concepts, describing which elements are definitely/possibly,
instances of the vague concept.
Rough DLs extend classical DLs with two modal-like opera-
tors. The approximations are based on an indiscernibility relation R
among individuals. The upper approximation of a concept includes
individuals that are indiscernible from at least another one that is
known to belong to the concept: C = {a | ∃b : R(a, b) ∧ b ∈ C}.
Similarly, the lower approximation is C = {a | ∀b : R(a, b)→ b ∈
C}. Intuitively, C of a concept C includes elements with the typical
properties of C, whereas C contains the prototypical instances of C.
Given the proposed metrics for individuals, they may be employed
to induce the definition of equivalence relations to be embedded into
Rough DL KBs [8]. Therefore, standard reasoners could be used.
Let NI the set of individual names and Fi ∈ C be a feature
concept. The projection pii : NI 7→ {0, 12 , 1}, given an individ-
ual a ∈ NI assigns to pii(a) the values 1 if K |= Fi(a), 0 if
K |= ¬Fi(a) and 12 otherwise. Two individuals, say a and b, are in-
discernible w.r.t. the contextC iff ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} : pii(a) = pii(b).
Then, the indiscernibility relation RC induced by C is defined as:
RC = {(a, b) ∈ NI ×NI | ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} : pii(a) = pii(b)}
Any indiscernibility relation partitionsNI (and then the domain of
an interpretation) into sets, i.e. equivalence classes (elementary sets)
denoted, for a generic individual a, with [a]C. In turn, each class in-
duces a concept, denoted Ca. The extension of a C-definable con-
cept corresponds to one of the union of elementary sets. The other
concepts may only be approximated. Let D be a generic DL con-
cept description. The contextual upper and lower approximations
of D w.r.t. C, denoted respectively with D
C
and DC, are defined:
D
C
= {a ∈ NI | Ca uD 6|= ⊥} and DC = {a ∈ NI | Ca v D}.
A less strict type of approximation is introduced, based on the
notion of tolerance [5]. Exploiting the dissimilarity functions, it is
easy to extend this kind of (contextual) approximation to the case
of Rough DL. Let a tolerance function on a set U be any function
τ : U × U 7→ [0, 1] such that ∀a, b ∈ U, τ(a, b) = 1 and τ(a, b) =
τ(b, a). Given a tolerance function τ on U and a threshold θ ∈ [0, 1],
a neighborhood function ν : U 7→ 2U is defined νθ(a) = {b ∈
U | τ(a, b) ≥ θ}. For each a ∈ U , the set νθ(a) is also called the
neighborhood of a.
Now, consider NI = U as universal set and a dissimilarity func-
tion dCp (for some context C) to define a tolerance function and a
threshold θ ∈ [0, 1]. It is easy to derive an equivalence relationship
on NI , where the classes are made up of individuals within a certain
degree of similarity, indicated by the threshold: [a]C = νθ(a). The
notions of upper and lower approximation w.r.t. the induced equiva-
lence relationship descend straightforwardly. These approximations
depend on the threshold, then there is a way to control the degree of
indiscernibility needed to model vague concepts. This applies also in
the standard Rough DL setting.
4 OUTLOOK
We explored here two possible application of (dis)similarity mea-
sures in a given context represented by a set of concepts within DL
KBs. As mentioned, further developments may come by the defi-
nition of kernel functions which can be easily plugged into kernel
machines to perform a wealthy of tasks such as contextual retrieval,
ranking, outlier and novelty detection, clustering, and so on.
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Ontology Archaeology: Mining a Decade of Effort on the 
Suggested Upper Merged Ontology
Adam Pease, Chris Benzmueller1
1 EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The  Suggested  Upper  Merged  Ontology  [5]  is  a  large 
ontology  defined  in  first-order  logic  with  some  higher-order 
extensions  [1].   The  project  began  in  the  year  2000.   Each 
version  has  been  released  open  source  and  publicly  from the 
start,  which provides a unique record of the construction of a 
formal ontology.  While initially just an upper ontology, it now 
encompasses a wide variety of domains, and some recent work 
has  involved  semi-automatically  merging  large  factbases  with 
the fully axiomatized hand-built  content  [3].  SUMO has been 
mapped by hand to all of English WordNet [6] and several other 
languages  (Elkateb  et  al  2006;  Borra  et  al  2010;  Pease& 
Fellbaum, 2010) and is used in natural language understanding 
tasks  (Pease  & Li,  2010).   SUMO is  supported  by  tools  for 
ontology development (Pease,  2003) and inference (Trac et  al 
2007) and used in the yearly CASC theorem proving competition 
(Pease et al 2010).
Before discussing some of the specifics of the development 
history, we must note that the historical data is still incomplete.  
A change in employment of the first author resulted in some data 
on the development of the domain ontologies being lost prior to 
mid-2004,  when  Articulate  Software  was  founded.   This 
accounts for the large non-linearity in the graph shown in Figure 
1 at that time.
For  the  first  two  years,  development  was  confined  to  the 
original  upper  level  effort:  the  Suggested  Upper  Merged 
Ontology.   The  first  step  in  the  project  involved  seeding  the 
ontology with the contents of all general-purpose, and formally 
defined axioms that we could find in open, academic work and 
merging those theories into a common structure.  This resulted in 
about 5700 lines of SUO-KIF code that was released May 11, 
2001.  After that point, the majority of axioms were developed 
by the SUMO project team, although many more small theories 
and additions were provided by others over the entire history. 
All contributions are credited in the CVS logs for the ontologies 
[13]
In June 2002 a large US government project provided support 
for creating a host of new domain ontologies that would extend 
SUMO.  These ontologies covered information about economy, 
finance,  government,  geography  and  many  other  topics 
necessary  for  encoding  facts  about  the  world's  geo-political 
situation.  It is these domain ontologies which would form the 
largest addition of domain content to SUMO for some time, and 
which is  responsible  in  the graph for  the first  major  jump in 
content size.
Early  in  2003  we  began  a  comprehensive  project  to  add 
content that would structure and define concepts more general 
than the new domain ontologies, yet more specific than SUMO 
itself.  This would become known as the MId-Level Ontology 
(MILO). The methodology for creating MILO was an outgrowth 
of  our  work  in  mapping  SUMO  to  WordNet  (Niles&Pease, 
2003).  After the original mapping was complete, it was clear  
that a vast number of linguistic terms (or what in WordNet are 
called  synsets)  lacked  a  mapping  to  an  equivalent  formally 
defined  concept  in  SUMO.   We  therefore  set  out  to  create 
roughly  equivalent  formal  concepts  for  every  synset  that 
appeared at least 3 times in the WordNet semantic concordance, 
or  SemCor (Miller  et  al  1993).   Since the completion of  that 
effort roughly a year later, MILO has continued to be an active 
site for development of new content as additional domains are 
covered,  and  new  intermediate-level  content  is  required  to 
structure  and  adequately  define  terms  that  apply  to  many 
domains. More recent significant new domains that can be seen 
increasing  the  size  of  the  overall  theory  were  many  military 
concepts added in 2006 and digital media concepts in 2010.
While SUMO has always viewed manual creation of formal 
axioms  as  the  primary  effort,  the  breadth  and  formality  of 
content  has  recently  enabled  databases  of  lightly  structured 
information to be integrated automatically, and to take advantage 
of the definitions that SUMO provides.  Simple factbases alone 
provide  little  opportunities  for  significant  inferences,  but 
combined with thousands of formal rules, many new and useful 
conclusions become possible through automated inference.  The 
mappings  to  Mondial,  portions  of  DBPedia,  the  Open 
Biomedical Ontologies, and YAGO have been significant.  The 
content  of  these databases  dwarfs  the hand-created content  in 
SUMO, as shown in Figure 2, which shows the same time period 
as Figure 1, but with, in order from the bottom, DBPedia, OBO 
and YAGO added.
1 Articulate Software, Angwin, CA, USA. Email: {apease, cbenzmueller}@articulatesoftware.com. 
SUMO
Total Terms relations Total Axioms Rules
1173 353 4741 932
MILO
Total Terms relations Total Axioms Rules
1662 159 5116 1183
Domain ontologies
Total Terms relations Total Axioms Rules
17312 708 77974 2041
Total for all 
ontologies
Total Terms relations Total Axioms Rules
20147 1220 87831 4156
Table 1: SUMO term and axiom statistics
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Lines of code are a useful approximation of the progress of 
ontology  development,  but  insufficient.   The  Sigma  browser 
provides statistics of how many terms are in the knowledge base, 
and how many of those terms are relations.  It also shows how 
many  axioms  there  are,  and  how many  of  those  axioms  are 
"if..then" rules.  Those numbers are shown in Table 1. Note that 
we do  not  include  totals  for  YAGO, which  dwarfs  the  hand-
coded content, and totals some 16,425,285 axioms.
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First Steps in the Computation of Root Justifications
Thomas Meyer and Kodylan Moodley1 and Ivan Varzinczak2
1 INTRODUCTION
Description Logics (DLs) are widely accepted as an appropriate class
of knowledge representation languages to represent and reason about
ontologies [2]. Tools for performing standard reasoning tasks such
as satisfiability and consequence checking have grown increasingly
powerful and sophisticated in the last decade [3, 7]. In section 2 we
review the standard approach for the resolution of modelling errors
encountered in ontologies and propose the first steps in a new method
for resolving such errors in section 3. The method is based on the no-
tion of root justifications which we define and discuss. The approach
we describe is applicable to a wide class of DLs. We don’t provide
a comprehensive formal introduction to DLs, but rather point the
reader to the book by Baader et al. [2]. For our purposes a DL TBox
consists of a finite set of axioms specifying the terminological part
of an ontology. The Tbox includes (but need not be limited to) sub-
sumption statements of the form E v F where E and F are (possi-
bly complex) concept descriptions, built up from basic concepts. The
semantics of DLs is based on the classical model theory for first-
order logic. A DL interpretation I contains a non-empty domain ∆I
of elements and a mapping which interprets a basic concept A as a
subset AI of ∆I . For purposes of illustration we shall assume that
complex concepts can be constructed using negation (¬E) and con-
junction (E uF ), where ¬E is interpreted as ∆I \EI , and E uF is
interpreted as EI ∩F I . However, the inclusion of negation and con-
junction is not a requirement. In addition, there may be other ways
of constructing complex concepts.
An interpretation I is a model of a Tbox axiom E v F if and
only if EI ⊆ F I . Given a Tbox Γ, a subsumption statement E v F ,
and a basic concept A, (i) Γ is A-unsatisfiable if and only if for all
models I of Γ, AI = ∅, and (ii) E v F is a consequence of Γ if and
only if every model of all axioms in Γ is also a model of E v F .
2 ONTOLOGY DEBUGGING AND REPAIR
The A-unsatisfiability of Γ may be an indication that Γ contains a
modelling error. Concept unsatisfiability is a special case of identi-
fying unwanted axioms to eliminate modelling errors in ontologies.
In general, ontology construction is an iterative process. During each
iteration a potential ontology is constructed, a domain expert iden-
tifies unwanted consequences of the ontology, and (minimal) mod-
ifications are made to the ontology to ensure that unwanted conse-
quences are eliminated. Formally, we are provided with a Tbox Γ
and an unwanted axiom U with the requirement that Γ 2 U .
In order to eliminate an unwanted axiom it is useful to determine
the possible causes of the axiom being a consequence of Γ. A sub-
set J of Γ is a U -justification for Γ if and only if J  U and for
1 Meraka Institute, CSIR and University of Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa.
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every J ′ ⊂ J , J ′ 2 U [1]. The notion of a U -justification is a gener-
alisation of a minimal unsatisfiability preserving sub-Tbox (MUPS)
[6], where the latter applies to unsatisfiable concepts. We denote by
JΓ(U) the set of all U -justifications for Γ. As a running example in
this paper, consider the following four Tbox axioms:
1. C v A 2. C v ¬A 3. F v C u ¬A 4. F v C
Let Γ be the set containing the four axioms above. We represent Γ as
the set {1, 2, 3, 4} with the understanding that the natural numbers
contained in the set are indices, representing the four axioms. Using
the same notation, and taking the axiom F v ⊥ to be an unwanted
axiom, it can be verified that JΓ(F v ⊥) = {{1, 3}, {1, 2, 4}}.
Justifications are useful for a number of reasons. They allow for
the pinpointing of the causes of modelling errors. In our example
they show that axioms 1 and 3 may not both occur in the ontology
without having F v ⊥ as a consequence. Similarly axioms 1, 2,
and 4 may not all occur in the ontology without having F v ⊥ as
a consequence. In practice it is frequently the case that justifications
are significantly smaller than the Tbox as a whole.
Justifications can also be used to perform ontology repair. A sub-
set R of a Tbox Γ is a U -repair for Γ if and only if R 2 U , and for
every R′ such that R ⊂ R′ ⊆ Γ, R′  U . We denote by RΓ(U)
the set of U -repairs for Γ. For our example it can be verified that
RΓ(F v ⊥) = {{2, 3, 4}, {1, 4}, {1, 2}}.
A subset D of Γ is a U -diagnosis for Γ if and only if D ∩ J 6= ∅
for every J ∈ JΓ(U). D is a minimal U -diagnosis for Γ if and
only if there is no U -diagnosis D′ for Γ such that D′ ⊂ D. The set
of minimal U -diagnoses for Γ, denoted by DΓ(U), can be used to
generate all the U -repairs for Γ as follows [5, 1, 6]:
Theorem 1 RΓ(U) = {Γ \D | D ∈ DΓ(U)}.
For our example DΓ(F v ⊥) = {{1}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}} from
which it can be verified, as we have seen, that RΓ(F v ⊥) =
{{2, 3, 4}, {1, 4}, {1, 2}}. There are efficient methods for generat-
ing U -repairs from the U -justifications, with Reiter’s hitting set al-
gorithm [5], and variants of it, probably being the best known.
So far we have dealt with a single unwanted axiom, but as the
discussion above indicates, it may well be that a domain expert iden-
tifies a set U of unwanted consequences. We are interested in (i) find-
ing the causes of the unwanted axioms, and (ii) repairing the Tbox Γ
by replacing it with a Tbox Γ′ with the requirement that Γ′ 2 U for
every U ∈ U . This is a generalisation of the idea of finding minimal
incoherence-preserving sub-TBoxes (MIPS) as a way of eliminating
all unsatisfiable concepts in a Tbox [6]. Finding the causes of the un-
wanted axioms is a matter of generating all U -justifications for every
U ∈ U . We denote the set of all suchU -justifications byJΓ(U). That
is, JΓ(U) = ⋃U∈U JΓ(U).
For our example, let U = {F v ⊥, C v ⊥}. We have al-
ready seen that JΓ(F v ⊥) = {{1, 3}, {1, 2, 4}}. It is easily
seen that JΓ(C v ⊥) = {{1, 2}} and therefore that JΓ(U) =
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{{1, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2}}.
For Tbox repair our goal is to find the U-repairs for Γ. A subset R
of Γ is a U-repair for Γ if and only if R 2 U for every U ∈ U , and
for every R′ for which R ⊂ R′ ⊆ Γ, R′  U for some U ∈ U . We
denote the set of U-repairs for Γ by RΓ(U). For our example it can
be verified thatRΓ(U) = {{2, 3, 4}, {1, 4}}.
An obvious method for computing Tbox repair is to eliminate un-
wanted axioms sequentially using existing methods for repair appro-
priate for dealing with a single unwanted axiom. However, the naı¨ve
approach to do so is not guaranteed to generate only U -repairs (i.e.,
elements of RΓ(U)): Suppose, in our example, that we decide to
eliminate F v ⊥ first (followed by the elimination of C v ⊥). As
we have seen on the previous page, the (F v ⊥)-repairs for Γ are
Γ1 = {2, 3, 4}, Γ2 = {1, 4}, and Γ3 = {1, 2}. Having eliminated
F v ⊥, we then move on to eliminating C v ⊥ from each Γi, for
i = 1, 2, 3. It is easy to see that Γ1 2 C v ⊥ and Γ2 2 C v ⊥,
but that Γ3  C v ⊥. We therefore leave Γ1 and Γ2 unchanged,
but we need to obtain the (C v ⊥)-repairs for Γ3. It can be veri-
fied that the (C v ⊥)-repairs for Γ3 are {{2}} and {{1}}. We thus
have, as candidates for the U-repairs of Γ, the sets Γ1 = {2, 3, 4}
and Γ2 = {1, 4}, as well as the two (C v ⊥)-repairs of Γ3: {2}
and {1}. But observe that the two (C v ⊥)-repairs of Γ3 are not
U-repairs for Γ (we will refer to such sets as false repairs).
It can be shown that the process described above (i) will gener-
ate subsets of U-repairs for Γ only, and (ii) will generate at least all
U-repairs for Γ. From this it follows that false U-repairs can be iden-
tified and removed: they will all be strict subsets of the U-repairs
for Γ. Nevertheless, it would be useful, for the sake of efficiency, to
eliminate the generation of such false U-repairs altogether.
It is possible to do better than the naı¨ve approach described above
by making an informed choice about which unwanted axioms to
eliminate first. Suppose that, in our example, and in contrast to
what we did above, we choose to eliminate C v ⊥ first (followed
by the elimination of F v ⊥). It can be verified that one of the
(C v ⊥)-repairs for Γ is the set {2, 3, 4}, which also turns out to be
a (F v ⊥)-repair for Γ. The reason for it being a (F v ⊥)-repair for
Γ as well, is that one of the (C v ⊥)-justifications for Γ ({1, 2}) is
a strict subset of one of the (F v ⊥)-justifications for Γ ({1, 2, 4}).
In this case it will thus be more efficient to choose C v ⊥ as the
unwanted axiom to be eliminated first, since we get the elimination
of F v ⊥ for free.
This heuristic can be formalised by drawing a distinction between
root and derived unwanted axioms [4]. Formally, an unwanted ax-
iom U is a derived unwanted axiom for Γ if and only if there exists
a U -justification J for Γ and a U ′-justification J ′ for Γ such that
J ′ ⊂ J . U is a root unwanted axiom for Γ if and only if it is not
a derived unwanted axiom for Γ. The goal is to eliminate root un-
wanted axioms first with the expectation that in the process of doing
so, other unwanted axioms may be eliminated as well. In our ex-
ample F v ⊥ is a derived unwanted axiom for Γ since there is a
(F v ⊥)-justification for Γ ({1, 2, 4}) which is a strict superset of
a (C v ⊥)-justification for Γ ({1, 2}, while C v ⊥ is a root un-
wanted axiom for Γ. According to this heuristic we should therefore
choose to eliminate the unwanted axiom C v ⊥ first.
Unfortunately the use of root unwanted axioms does not elimi-
nate the possibility of generating false U -repairs. Suppose that, in
our example, we decide to eliminate C v ⊥ first because it is a root
unwanted axiom. It is easily verified that the (C v ⊥)-repairs for Γ
are Γ3 = {2, 3, 4} and Γ4 = {1, 3, 4}. Having eliminated C v ⊥,
we then proceed to eliminate the remaining unwanted axiom F v ⊥
from both Γ3 and Γ4. It is easily verified that Γ3 2 F v ⊥, but that
Γ4  F v ⊥. So we leave Γ3 unchanged, but we need to generate
the (F v ⊥)-repairs of Γ4. They are {3, 4} and {1, 4}. The can-
didate U-repairs for Γ are therefore Γ3, {3, 4}, and {1, 4}. And as
can be verified, Γ3 and {1, 4} are both U-repairs for Γ, but {3, 4}
is not. As we have noted, it is possible to recognise {3, 4} as a false
U-repair since it is a subset of one of the U-repairs.
3 ROOT JUSTIFICATIONS
We now briefly discuss some preliminary work on an alternative ap-
proach to ontology repair. The key difference is to deal with un-
wanted axioms simultaneously, rather than sequentially. The basic
notion we need is that of a root justification. Given a Tbox Γ and
a set of unwanted axioms U , a set RJ is a U-root justification for
Γ if and only if it is a U -justification for Γ for some U ∈ U (i.e.
RJ ∈ J (U)), and there is no J ∈ J (U) such that J ⊂ RJ .
We denote the set of U-root justifications for Γ by RJ Γ(U). As
we have seen, for our example the set of all U-justifications is
JΓ(U) = {{1, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2}}, and therefore the set of U-root
justifications for Γ is RJΓ(U) = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}.
The significance of root justifications is that they can be used to
generate precisely the U-repairs for Γ, in the same way in which U -
repairs are generated from justifications for a single unwanted axiom.
A subsetD of Γ is a U-diagnosis for Γ if and only ifD∩RJ 6= ∅ for
every RJ ∈ RJ (U). D is a minimal U-diagnosis for Γ if and only
if there is no U-diagnosis D′ (for Γ) such that D′ ⊂ D. The set of
minimal U-diagnoses for Γ is denoted by DΓ(U). We then have the
following theorem showing that the U-repairs for Γ can be obtained
from the U-diagnoses for Γ:
Theorem 2 RΓ(U) = {Γ \D | D ∈ DΓ(U)}.
For our example we have already seen that RJΓ(U) =
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}}. From this it follows that DΓ(U) = {{1}, {2, 3}}
and therefore, as indicated by the theorem, that RΓ(U) =
{{2, 3, 4}, {1, 4}}.
We have implemented a Prote´ge´ 4 plugin3 for computing root jus-
tifications for sets of unwanted axioms (http://ksg.meraka.
org.za/˜kmoodley/protege). We are extending the plugin to
compute the U-repairs. The next step will be to compare this ap-
proach to ontology repair with both the naı¨ve sequential approach
described above, as well as the improved sequential method which
uses root unwanted axioms to determine the sequence in which un-
wanted axioms are eliminated.
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A Contextual Approach to Detection of
Conflicting Ontologies
Michael Chan1 and Jos Lehmann2 and Alan Bundy3
1 INTRODUCTION
The knowledge represented in an ontology can be regarded as
merely a perception from a particular perspective – whether
it be that of the modeler or of an autonomous agent. Such
interpretation is inline with the representation of ontological
knowledge in a context, which is often regarded as a subthe-
ory about the world for a particular situation. Our primary
interest is to automatically evolve ontologies by diagnosing
and repairing ontological faults, so we will describe a pre-
liminary investigation into the detection of conflicts between
ontologies by means of analysing relations between contexts.
The presentation of the analysis is based on an example of a
physics paradox, caused by a contradiction between the pre-
dictive theory and sensory data.
Suppose a bouncy ball B is suspended at a height above
ground and a student, who believes that the total energy (TE)
of an object is always defined as the summation of only the
kinetic energy (KE) and potential energy (PE), is to predict
TE of the ball when it impacts with the ground. Sensory data
shows that both the velocity and the height can be deduced to
be zero at that moment. This causes a contradiction because
the TE at the end of the drop, TE(B ,End(Drop)), calculated
using the sensory data is zero, whereas the predicted value
is positive by the law of energy conservation. The paradox
arises from the (wrong) idealisation of the ball as a particle
without extent, so the contribution of elastic energy to TE is
neglected. This is the bouncing-ball paradox.
A natural representation of the paradox is to encode the
predictive theory in one ontology (Ot) and the sensory data
in another (Os), letting each be a separate ontology and be
locally consistent. The theoretical ontology contains the rele-
vant physics laws, including the theoretical definitions of TE,
KE, PE, etc. To give an accurate representation ofOs, in con-
trast, is to not assert the values of final velocity and height,
but to assert the values from the raw data. In essence, the stu-
dent’s calculations of final velocity and height are based on
the raw data collected from the experiment and are, there-
fore, deduced. However, physics laws and relevant definitions
are defined in terms of basic properties such as velocities and
heights and do not directly refer to specific attributes of an
experiment. Thus, it is essential to bridge this gap, created
by the heterogeneity of signatures, so that the relevant terms
are properly related across the ontologies.
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2 HETEROGENEOUS SIGNATURES
Requiring Ot and Os to share a set of signature elements and
contain relevant definitions can avoid numerous problems as-
sociated with the reasoning and the representation, but at
the cost of decreased accuracy and generality. For more accu-
rate and flexible representations, we handle the case in which
the ontologies do not share a common signature. Let Ot con-
tain the law of energy conservation, relevant definitions, and
claims about the initial state of the ball:
Ax(T (Ot)) ::= { ∀p:Part , ti, tj:Mom.TE(p, ti) = TE(p, tj),
∀p:Part , t:Mom. TE(p, t) = KE(p, t) + PE(p, t),




∀p:Part , t:Mom. PE(p, t) ::= Mass(p, t).G.Height(p, t) }
Ax(A(Ot)) ::= { Vel(B , Start(Drop)) = 0,
Height(B , Start(Drop)) > 0, . . . } ∪Ax(T (Ot))
where Part and Mom respectively denote the sets of particles
and moments; Ax(T (O)) and Ax(A(O)) denote the axioms of
the TBox and ABox of the ontology O, respectively. We adopt
description logic’s distinction between TBox and ABox even
though we work with higher-order logic. As will be explained
later, this distinction provides several technical benefits. As
with Os, we shall augment the background story of the para-
dox by assuming that the experiment involves only shooting
a series of high-speed photos of the ball while it drops:
Ax(A(Os)) ::= { Posn(B ,Photo(B ,End(Drop)−∆)) = 0,
Posn(B ,Photo(B ,End(Drop))) = 0, . . . }
where Posn(B ,Photo) = p means that the position of the ball
B in the photograph Photo is at position p. In the current set-
ting, we can assume Posn to return the 1-D position according
to a fixed reference, e.g., a vertical ruler; Photo(O, T ) returns
the photo of object O taken at time T .
The above configuration requires a significantly different
approach for conflict diagnosis because the knowledge repre-
sented in Ot and Os is insufficient to relate the terms in Ot
to Posn in Os. Such asymmetry renders the derivation of a
contradiction impossible, but may be tackled, e.g., by using
McCarthy’s notion of lifting axioms described in his work on
the formalisation of contexts [3] and in Guha’s work on mi-
crotheories [2].
2.1 Lifting Axioms
Lifting axioms are rules that help bridge across individual
contexts, enabling terms from one context to be translated
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into another. Using McCarthy’s syntax, we may need another
ontology, Ob, containing information about relationships be-
tween the terms in T (Ot) and those in Os in order to bridge
across them. Even Ob connects with Ot and Os, an inconsis-
tency is avoided because the value assertions in the ABoxes
are not included in Ob, which eliminates the potential prob-
lem of merging conflicting value assertions. For the described
Ot and Os, the axioms of T (Ob) can be:
Ax(T (Ob)) ::= { ∀p:Part , t:Mom. Ot.Vel(p, t) = (1)
(Os.Posn(p,Photo(p, t−∆))−Os.Posn(p,Photo(p, t)))/
(t− (t−∆)),
∀p:Part , t:Mom. Ot.Height(p, t) = Os.Posn(p, t), (2)
∀p:Part , ti, tj:Mom. Ot.TE(p, ti) = Ot.TE(p, tj), . . . } (3)
The term c.p is our shorthand for McCarthy’s term
value(c, p), which designates the value of the term p in a con-
text (in our case, an ontology) c. Thus, (1) expresses that
the value of Vel(p, t) in Ot is equal to the difference between
the positions returned by Posn in Os given two photos, each
taken at the beginning and the end of the corresponding inter-
val, divided by the length of the interval. Similarly, (2) means
that the value of Height(p, t) in Ot is the same as the value
of Posn(p, t) in Os.
As one would expect, lifting axioms can also be used to
relate terms in the simple setup of ontologies that share the
same signature. For example, if Os shares the same signature
as Ot and has a theory over the domain containing only B
and End(Drop):
Ax(T (Os)) ::= { TE(B , End(Drop)) =
KE(B , End(Drop)) + PE(B , End(Drop)), . . . }
The corresponding Ob will not contain (1) or (2), but contain
the following additional lifting axioms:
Ax(T (Ob)) ::= { Ot.TE(B , End(Drop)) =
Os.TE(B ,End(Drop)), . . . }
3 CONFLICT DETECTION
We adopt a similar approach to detecting a conflict between
ontologies represented using contexts as that described in [1],
i.e. logically derive formulae from the ontologies that imply
a derivable contradiction. Since the representation of ontolo-
gies as contexts is more complex than that using object-level
logic, care is required to reason with both the meta- and
object-levels. Before deriving the trigger formulae from the
ontologies, each axiom in Ot and Os need to be syntactically
modified by renaming every term in Ot and Os, so that the
end results are guaranteed to not share any part of the signa-
ture. Consequently, Ob is modified accordingly as it specifies
the relationships between the terms in the working ontologies.
The purpose of the renaming is to avoid an inconsistency from
arising when parts of the ontologies are merged, which will be




′) ::= {φ{tmi/tm}} | φ ∈ Ax(Oi), tm ∈ φ}
where φ{tmi/tm} denotes that occurrences of term tm in the
formula φ are renamed to tmi; tm ∈ φ means that tm is a
term in the formula φ. The resulting Ot
′, Os′, and Ob′ for Ot,
Os, and Ob, respectively, are therefore:
Ax(T (O′t)) ::= { ∀p:Part , ti, tj:Mom.TE t(p, ti) = TE t(p, tj),
∀p:Part , t:Mom. TE t(p, t) = KEt(p, t) + PEt(p, t), . . . }
Ax(A(O′s)) ::= { Posns(B ,Photos(B ,Ends(Drop)−∆)) = 0,
Posns(B ,Photos(B ,Ends(Drop))) = 0 }
Ax(O′b) ::= { ∀p:Part , t:Mom. Ot.Vel t(p, t) =
(Os.Posn
s(p,Photos(p, t−∆))−Os.Posns(p,Photos(p, t)))/
(t− (t−∆)), . . . }
For the sake of symmetry, terms in both Ot and Os are re-
named.
Based on the trigger formulae designed for the Where’s my
stuff (wms) ontology repair plan [1], a conflict between Ot
and Os through lifting axioms is detected if at least two of
the following three are matched:
Ot ` stuff (~s) = v1 (4)
Os ` stuff (~s) = v2 (5)
O′b ` o.stuff (~s) = ψ,Th({decntxt(o.stuff (~s) = ψ)} ∪ (6)
Ax(A(O′t)) ∪Ax(A(O′s))) ` stuff (~s) = vb
where O′b ` o.stuff (~s) = ψ means that the term stuff (~s)
in ontology o can be expressed as ψ in Ob; decntxt(φ) de-
contextualises the formula φ such that every term in φ is con-
sidered to reside in the same context, i.e. decntxt(o1.f = o2.g)
gives f = g. With wms, conflict is detected if only (4)
and (5) are matched and that Ot ` v1 6= v2. The cover-
age of this trigger is somewhat limited because, for example,
stuff (B , End(Drop)) = v cannot be deduced in Os alone if
stuff is not in the signature of Os. The wms trigger formulae
can be augmented with (6), such that any two of (4), (5), and
(6), and that Ot ` v1 6= v2 (6= vb), depending on the matching
formulae, can trigger repair. Note that the resulting merge of
the two ABoxes in (6) is guaranteed to be consistent as Ot
and Os no longer potentially share signature elements, due to
the renaming by {tmt/tm|tm ∈ φ} and {tms/tm|tm ∈ φ} to
every term in each respective ontology.
A conflict can be detected in the bouncing-ball paradox
represented using the lifting axioms in (1) and onwards: (4)
and (6) can be matched by the substitution {stuff /TE t,
~s/〈B ,End(Drop)〉, o/Ot, v1/x. x > 0, vb/0} and substitut-
ing ψ for the sum of KE and PE, expressed in respect to the
terms in Os:
0.5 . Masss(B ,Ends(Drop)).((Posns(B ,Photos(B ,
Ends(Drop)−∆))− Posns(B ,Photos(B ,Ends(Drop))))/
(Ends(Drop)− (Ends(Drop)−∆)))2 + . . .
Clearly, the complexity of the detection mechanism presented
is significantly higher than that presented in [1]. One obvi-
ous challenge is to reason with knowledge in both meta- and
object-levels, i.e. that in Ob and Ot and/or Os. That said, de-
tecting ontological conflicts as contextual ones enables higher
generality, thus accuracy, in the modelling and representation.
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